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Abstract—Emerging self-driving vehicles are vulnerable to 
different attacks due to the principle and the type of 
communication systems that are used in these vehicles. These 
vehicles are increasingly relying on external communication via 
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). VANETs add new threats 
to self-driving vehicles that contribute to substantial challenges in 
autonomous systems. These communication systems render self-
driving vehicles vulnerable to many types of malicious attacks, 
such as Sybil attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), black hole, grey hole 
and wormhole attacks. In this paper, we propose an intelligent 
security system designed to secure external communications for 
self-driving and semi self-driving cars. The proposed scheme is 
based on Proportional Overlapping Score (POS) to decrease the 
number of features found in the Kyoto benchmark dataset. The 
hybrid detection system relies on the Back Propagation neural 
networks (BP), to detect a common type of attack in VANETs: 
Denial-of-Service (DoS). The experimental results show that the 
proposed BP-IDS is capable of identifying malicious vehicles in 
self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. 
Index Terms—Self-driving cars, ANNs, IDS, BP. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The traditional definition of the internet has expanded to 
become a ubiquitous network that is now often called the 
Internet-of-Things (IoTs), featuring Machine to Machine 
(M2M) communication. This type of connectivity can provide 
an efficient connectivity for self-driving vehicles. 
Self-driving vehicles are considered one of the most important 
aspects of device to device communication [1]. VANETs are a 
wireless mobile networks which allow self-driving vehicles to 
exchange beacons of information, such as Cooperative 
Awareness Messages (CAMs) with each other and road side 
units (RSUs) in their communication area. It is aimed to 
send/receive warning messages between neighboring vehicles, 
in order to offer road safety and comfort services on busy roads. 
In wireless networks, malicious attacks can be launched from 
any location at any time within the radio area, because they do 
not have firewall and gateways, while in wired networks the 
malicious attack needs physical access to make an attack [2]. 
Each vehicle is very much exposed to being compromised 
because the car is free to move independently and does not have 
any physical protection [1]. Self-driving vehicles depend on the 
cooperative participation of other vehicles within the radio 
coverage area, this is because external communication has 
decentralized architecture. In this case, attackers try to break the 
cooperative protocols between the vehicles and the RSUs. 
Security systems such as encryption/decryption mechanisms 
and digital signatures can be used to reduce the amount of 
potential attacks on VANETs that were considered as the first 
line of defense. Moreover, these algorithms are unable to protect 
the system from unknown attacks because they were not 
designed to secure VANETs from these known attacks. For this 
reason, self-driving vehicles need a second line of defense in 
place to detect and identify these novel attacks, i.e. an intrusion 
detection system (IDS). 
A primary approach to detecting the malicious behaviour in 
vehicle is through the communication between the CAMs, via 
VANET between self-driving vehicles and with their RSUs. 
Any intrusion detection scheme proposed to secure the routing 
protocol of VANETs of self-driving vehicles has two issues: (1) 
securing transmitted data from a vehicle to another (device to 
device), (2) securing and monitoring whole CAMs transmitted 
between vehicles the RSUs. IDS is considered an effective way 
to detect an intruder in the external communication of self-
driving vehicles [2]. The IDS should be captured and examined 
for each packet that has been transferred or received between 
vehicles. This process is called audit data. The security system 
can determine normal and abnormal behaviour based on the 
audit data that has been collected from VANETs.  
An IDS is composed of three phases: 
• Data collection phase. 
• Analysis data phase. 
• Response phase.  
In our paper, we propose misuse detection and anomaly 
detection or hybrid IDS based on Back Propagation artificial 
neural networks (ANNs) to predict attacks on the external 
communications of self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. 
In other words, the proposed IDS is targeted to detect different 
types of cyber-attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) and network scanning. We utilized the Kyoto data set to 
evaluate the performance metrics of the proposed hybrid 
security system [3]. In this paper, we have two contributions, 
namely: 
1) Reduce the number of features found in the Kyoto 
benchmark dataset. 
2) Design intelligent intrusion detection scheme. It is 
based on a hierarchical network model. 
The figure 1 demonstrates the basic structure of the proposed 
IDS that has been installed on each vehicle to detect malicious 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig. 1. Basic Structure IDS 
The rest of the research paper is organized as follows: Section 
II: Literature reviews. Section III: Benchmark data set 
collection. Section IV: The proposed security system. Section V: 
Experimental evaluation and results. Section VI: Discussion and 
section VII: Conclusion. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEWS 
In the next five years, it is projected that more than 250milion 
vehicles will be connected together with RSUs [4]. Self-driving 
and semi self-driving vehicles will be a major element in the IoT 
domain, with one in five vehicles having wireless 
communication by 2020 [4]. Petit et al. have investigated 
potential cyber-attacks and threats on automation and 
cooperative automated vehicles [5]. Their research demonstrates 
that these vehicles will be associated with many different types 
of such attacks. In addition, these vehicles need to be built with 
the awareness of these threats in mind, and thus incorporated 
into the early stage development of self-driving vehicles. Zhang 
et al. have presented surveys for defense schemes and attacks 
such as Sybil in the related area of the IoT [1]. The authors define 
three as a serious type of Sybil attacks: SA-1, SA-2 and SA-3, 
these have a direct and negative impact on performance and 
privacy data of smart objects in IoT. Ali et al. have proposed 
intelligent security systems to secure external communication of 
self-driving vehicles [6]. These systems have the ability to detect 
two types of attacks such as a grey hole and rushing attacks. The 
authors noted that IDS can be built based on two technologies 
which are Feed-Forward Neural Network (FFNN) and Support 
Vector Machine (SVM). They also compared the two 
technologies to identify which one is more accurate. Tahir et al. 
have presented a security scheme for the networked sensor 
systems [7]. Their system is based on using the inherent features 
of a device to generate a secure identity for devices in their 
environment. Petit et al. have compared the different ways that 
reflect the current case of identification and standardization of 
open challenges of security and privacy of automotive vehicles 
[8]. In other words, they created a survey of the requirements 
and challenges of principle security in self-driving vehicles. In 
practice, this survey focused on pseudonym approaches which 
relied on keys of cryptography mechanisms. 
Our previous work had researched IDS systems that focused 
either on detecting abnormal behaviour [9] or misuse [10], here 
we propose a first system that addresses the detection of both 
through a hybrid IDS. However, we proposed a hybrid security 
system to secure and identify attacks in external communication 
of self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles.  
III. BENCHMARK DATA SET COLLECTION 
The dataset utilised is considered one of the most important 
factors in evaluating the efficiency of any proposed system. 
Most of the previous researches used the KDD Cup 99’ data set 
for evaluating performance of the proposed security system [11]. 
However, we cannot use this data in the research work presented 
here, as it suffers from a major problem of not covering current 
and recent network topologies and latest attack trends. This data 
is outdated it was extracted and created by system simulation 
more than 10 years ago [3]. We used the Kyoto benchmark in 
testing and evaluating performance of the proposed IDS. It is 
built from the real traffic data on a network. This honeypot data 
was collected over a 3-year period [11]. The Kyoto data set 
consists of two types of data: 
1) Kyoto data set with Internet Protocol (IP) source and 
IP destination. 
2) Kyoto data set without IP. 
We used the first option as it utilises a label field of normal 
and abnormal connection. This type of the Kyoto data set 
consists of 24 factors that reflect normal and abnormal behaviour 
of a network. The first 14 features were derived from KDD Cup 
99’ data set, as well as the remainder of the features generated 
from a real network. Table 1 shows the types of features. 
TABLE 1 FEATURES OF KYOTO DATA SET 
Feature Name Feature Source 
Duration, Service, Source bytes, Destination bytes, 
Count, Same srv rate, Serror rate, Srv serror rate, 
Dst host count, Dst host srv count, Dst host same 
src port rate, Dst host serror rate, Dst host srv 
serror rate and Flag 
 
 
KDD Cup 99’ 
IDS_detection, Malware_detection, 
Ashula_detction, Label, Source IP Address, Source 
Port Number, Destination IP Address, Destination 
Port Number, Start Time and Duration 
 
Real Network 
IDS researchers recommended the use of this data set in any 
new proposed IDS because it gives a more practical and accurate 
evaluation and results [3]. 
IV. THE PROPOSED SECURITY SYSTEM 
The detection system and reducing process of the number of 
features are considered a significant contribution made in this 
paper. It consists of five phases which are: 
1) The preprocessing phase. 
2) The features selection phase. 
3) The Fuzzification phase. 
4) The training and testing phases. 
The proposed intelligent IDS is a utilised MPL that is 
comprised of four layers: an input layer, a two hidden layers and 
an output layer. The fuzzification data is considered input data 
for the first layer that consists of 65 neurons. The number of 
hidden layers and neurons based on the accuracy of the training 
phase. In other words, we designed IDS with two hidden layers; 
the first hidden layer consists of 12 neurons while the second 
hidden layer consists of five neurons. The proposed security 
system has three values in the output layer which are: normal, 
abnormal and unknown. The detection phase is considered the 
second contribution of proposed IDS.  
The steps below explain the methodology of the proposed IDS 
and how we were able to reduce the number of features and 
maintaining the detection accuracy with fuzzification. Figure 3 
shows the overall IDS architecture.  
A. Preprocessing Data Set Phase 
We utilize the Kyoto benchmark data set to evaluate 
performance of the proposed security system. This data set 
needed preprocessing stages such as: encoding, uniform 
1) Encoding stage: Some features were represented by 
symbols such as a flag feature with symbols: “SO”, “REJ”, 
“RSTO”, “SF”. We needed to convert symbol features to 
numerical values before making any changes to the data set. 
This process is considered important because the feature 
vector fed to the input layer of BP and had to be numerical. 
2)  Uniform distribution stage: This is very important to 
BP. Without it, the system training would not be accurate. 
We prepared 60,000 data set records to simulate the 
proposed security system. It is divided into three subsets 
with each of them having different number of normal and 
abnormal records that were generated randomly from the 
original dataset. They had the following property: if the 
sample number of normal pattern is T subset and the 
original dataset has D samples, then there is a probability 
of finding a sample of class normal in the first subset D/T 
samples of the final data. Hence, each subset of the final 
data set has almost the same distribution and ratio of record 
type of the full data set.  
3) Normalization of numerical attributes stage: In the 
normalization, each numerical is value set between 0.0 and 
1.0 according to Equation 1. As a result, neural network 
training is often more efficient with normalized data, it is 
used as the preferable predictor. 
X=	 																																																																(1) 
Where X is the normalized value with a range between 1 and 
0, x is the original value, max and min are maximum and 
minimum values of the original variable. These values are used 
to match the upper and lower limits of the activation Function-
Sigmoid that have been used in the ANN models.  
In the training phase, we set some data set of validation to 
overcome one common problem in ANN which is over-fitting 
that usually occurs during the training phase. The training 
process is stopped when validation errors increase for a specified 
number of iterations. 
B. Extract The Impact of Features Input Phase 
Feature selection and the ranking process for significant 
features are considered important issues in design of the 
detection systems [12]. Thus, the effective and efficient 
performance of the IDS heavily depends on the number and type 
of Kyoto features. In other words, the elimination of useless 
features improves the detection rate, decreasing the computation 
time and memory, hence enhancing the overall performance of 
an IDS.  
The most important features are selected to increase the 
accuracy of the detection and reducing the amount of the false 
alarms. In this paper, a statistical approach is utilised to select 
significant features that have a high weight value and a critical 
effect, namely the Proportional Overlapping Score (POS) 
technique [13]. 
The POS is calculated for each feature in Kyoto benchmark 
to avoid from the outlier’s effect. In this case, relevant features 
selection depends on the measure for the overlap value. The 
designer can set the dataset size of the selected features [14]. The 
POS is considered the most efficient and suitable method with 
common types of dataset [13]. Furthermore, it is effective, even 
with a dataset that has classification problems. These problems 
are examples such as outliers and high-dimensional binary [14]. 
The POS is employed to calculate the overlapping rate in the 
dataset. The recognition features are picked up by measuring the 
overlap between feature values in the Kyoto dataset across two 
classes. It yields a perfect performance on all types of dataset 
with different classifiers approach [13]. We used the statistical 
R language for programming the POS method that pseudocode 
is shown below: 
Algorithm  POS Method
1. inputs: "data1.csv". 
2. output: Sequence of the selected features. 
3. install.packages("propOverlap"). 
4. source("http://bioconductor.org/biocLite.R"). 
5. biocLite("Biobase"). 
5. library(propOverlap). 
6. ?propOverlap. 
7. getwd(). 
8. data <- read.csv("data1.csv",header=T). 
9. str(data). 
10. data <- t(data). 
11. G <- data[1:23,] # define the features matrix 23. 
12. G <- jitter(G). # to avoid the noise in data 
13. class <- as.factor(data[24,]) #define class labels. 
14. set.seed(1234). 
15. selection <- Sel.Features(G, Class, K=23,Verbose=TRUE) 
# the main function. 
16. selection$Features. # extract the number of features  
17. selection$Measures. # extract name of features. 
Now, each feature is tagged with overlap value, we then start 
removing the features which had the lowest weight. The 
principle of trial-and-error is used to determine the optimal 
number of extracted features based on accuracy detection in the 
training phase for ANN [15]. In other words, we started with 23 
features and after each round of training we calculated the 
training accuracy and deleted features that had less influence in 
the detection process. This process will be repeated several times 
until we get to the criteria which is: the optimal number of the 
features that is based on the training accuracy.  
In this paper, we can achieve 99.18% training accuracy with 
13 features, that describes normal and abnormal behaviour in the 
Kyoto benchmark. Reducing the number of features is the first 
contribution in this paper. The proposed IDS examined with all 
features and 13 selected features. These features are shown in 
table 2. 
TABLE 2 SIGNIFICANT FEATURES  
Signaficant Feature Name Feature Source 
Duration, Service, Source bytes, 
Destination bytes, Count, Dst host 
count, Dst host srv count, and Flag 
 
KDD Cup 99’ 
Label, Source IP Address, Source 
Port Number, Destination IP 
Address, Destination Port Number 
and Duration 
 
Real Network 
        distribution and normalization.
C. The Fuzzification Phase 
 Fuzzy set is considered an optimal solution for a dataset that 
suffered from the classification problems [16]. The significant 
features are selected from the Kyoto benchmark dataset and had 
a direct and positive impact on the performance of the proposed 
IDS [17]. In this paper, we reduce the number of features that 
made the name of classes for normal and malicious behavior, as 
it is not very well separated. In this case, the detection rate is 
declined and increases the number of false alarms.  
The fuzzification process has the ability to establish a clear 
border within significant features to fix classification problems 
[16]. In Table 2, we have illustrated the role of the fuzzification 
in changing the results for the better. 
 ( , , , ) = 	( 	( − − , − − ),0)            (2) 
 Where, x is the normal value of the dataset before 
fuzzification while a, b and c values represent the fuzzy domain 
values. The proposed security system is to ultimately be more 
efficient with fuzzification data [15]. In other words, it has the 
ability to fix the confusion or ambiguity through redistributing 
each feature value with new five values. Equation 2 allows each 
value from the selected features to take five values from the 
fuzzy domain with interval range is [0, 1].  
TABLE 3 PERFORMANCE METRICS 
 
IDS with all Features     
IDS with    
13 
Features 
IDS with 13 
Fuzzification 
Features 
Misuse Detection Normal 97.5% 99.79% 99.23% 
Misuse Detection 
Abnormal 
99.2% 64.34% 99.05% 
Anomaly Detection 
Normal 
92.04% 60.35% 99.04% 
Anomaly Detection 
Abnormal 
99.85% 98.45% 99.06% 
Unknown Rate 28.5 0% 0.03 
Average FP Alarm  2.27% 23.61% 1.82% 
Average FN Alarm  1.01% 7.38% 0.4% 
Average Error Rate 1.9% 19.32% 0.88% 
Training Para.Epochs 115 75 27 
According to table 3, we can easily notice the important role 
of the fuzzification dataset in enhancing detection rate, reducing 
the amount of false alarms and error rate. In addition, 
fuzzification features have a positive reflect on the training 
phase for ANN reducing the number of epochs. 
D. The Training and Testing Phase 
In our IDS, we employ a popular supervised learning of 
neural network architecture called multi-layer perceptron (MLP) 
with back-propagation gradient-descent in the designed security 
system [17]. The collection of non-linear neurons is connected 
to each other to form a feed-forward multi-layer in MLP [18]. 
This technique is known to be robust for prediction and 
classification problems. Figure 2 demonstrates the graphical 
representation of the original MLP used in this research. Cross-
validation is used to determine the “optimal” number of hidden 
layers and neurons that were based on the experimental design 
of the IDS. Specifically, MLPs started from a small number of 
neurons, and with one hidden layer, that measures the error ratio 
of the trained BP on holdout samples, steadily increasing the 
number of neurons at a hidden layer where the performance of 
the trained phase on holdout samples has started to decline due 
to overtraining problem. In this case, we determine an optimal 
number of neurons for the hidden layer of the ANN. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
           Fig. 2. Graphical representation of our MLP neural network model 
We used a 100-fold cross-validation to decrease the bias 
related with the process of random splitting of the Kyoto data set 
into training phase and testing phase. The network training ends 
when the Least-square-error E between the desired  and actual 
output		   is less than Emax or when the number of sweeps equal 
500. We define 	 ∗  .  
 = 12 		 	 ( 	 − 	 ) 			 																																															(3) 
Where p is the total number of training patterns, and: = 				1		 	 ℎ 	 	 					 ∈ 	−1																																																											 ℎ  
For all experiments, the learning rate  was fixed to 1*10-7 
for each training yielding difference, of which the best result is 
selected. In our research, we used trial-and-error attempts to 
configure the best ratio of training depending on the condition 
put on the second phase of the proposal. Table 4 shows some of 
the configuration parameters used in the ANN. 
TABLE 4 ANN PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Train Parameter epochs 81 
Train Parameter ln. 1*10-7 
Train Parameter goal 0 
Train Parameter Minimum Gradient 1*10-11 
In the detection phase, we tested the detection system with 
significant features that selected from the Kyoto benchmark data 
set. The behaviours are analyzed and then the IDS generates four 
types of alarms: true positive, true negative, false positive and 
false negative [6]. These alarms and the detection accuracy rate 
are used to measure the IDS performance. The detection phase 
has three outputs which are: normal, abnormal and unknown. 
We design the simulation on a system with an Intel core i3 
processor “2.53GHZ” and 4GB RAM memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Overall IDS Architecture 
The misuse and anomaly detection systems are utilised so 
ANN can efficiently learn the benign and malicious behaviours 
through the iterative operation [19]. In addition, it has the ability 
to improve real-time responsiveness and reducing the costs. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
The proposed IDS used a dataset of 60,000 records to 
describe the normal, abnormal and unknown behaviour in 
networks. The data set used in our evaluations come from the 
Kyoto University as indicated above [20]. The accuracy training 
algorithm is = 99.18%. The accuracy of the detection is 
calculated based on Equation 4 below [17] [21]:  = 	 	 	 		 	 	 		(4)	 ( ) = + 																																																						(5) ( ) = + 																																																					(6) = (1 − ) = + 																																		(7) = (1 − ) = + 																																		(8) 
The data set was divided into three subsets: the test set 
(25%), the validation set (25%) and the training set (50%). We 
tried to avoid one of the most common problems of an ANN 
which was the over fitting by specific parts of the data used to 
validate. 
A. Training and Testing IDS with Misuse Detection 
We used a misuse detection technique in designing the IDS. 
This system has two features: high detection rate and low false 
alarms. These characteristics are made more interactive when 
building any IDS. The accuracy of the detection rate and the 
number of records that were used in our proposed IDS is shown 
in Table 5. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 CLASSIFICATION RATE 
Class Original No. Neural No. Accuracy 
Normal 6895 6829 99.04% 
Abnormal 3105 3076 99.06% 
Unknown 0 4 0.04% 
Table 6 shows the rate of alarm and error rate that generated 
in our proposal based on Equations 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
TABLE 6 ALARM AND ERROR RATES 
Alarm Rates 
True positive  99.59% False negative 0.40% 
True negative  97.99% False positive 2.00% 
Error Rate       0.95%   
B. Training and Testing IDS with Anomaly Detection 
We trained and tested the proposed security system with the 
Kyoto data set [11]. The performance of the proposed IDS is 
directly related to anomaly detection algorithm. If the anomalies 
are detected correctly from the data set, it provides a high 
detection rate and less false alarms. The anomaly detection has 
the ability to detect novel attacks. Our experiment showed that 
the performance of the IDS is largely influenced by the type of 
training data. 
The system calculated the classification rate and generated 
four types of alarms for the proposed IDS as shown in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 CLASSIFICATION RATE 
Class Original No. Neural No. Accuracy 
Normal 6640 6887 99.23% 
Abnormal 3060 3031 99.05% 
Unknown 0 3 0.03% 
Table 8 shows the rate of four alarms and error rate of 
detection system of communication of self-driving vehicles that 
were calculated based on Equation 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
TABLE 8 ALARM AND ERROR RATES 
Alarm Rates 
True positive  99.60% False negative 0.40%
True negative  98.34% False positive 1.65%
Error Rate       0.82%   
VI. DISCUSSION 
Conventional security systems are not able to protect the 
external communication of self-driving and semi self-driving 
vehicles. In this case, we need to identify new security methods 
or modify the current protection schemes in order to provide 
efficient functionality in protecting these types of networks.  
In our paper, the alarm rate fluctuates between 97.99% and 
99.60%. This enables an efficient detection rate with an average 
rate error of 0.88% while the previous best achieved average 
error rate was 8.68% [22]. In [22], the average rate of false alarm 
is 4.86%, while we achieved 1.64% with the IDS presented here. 
Thus, our results confirm that the performance of hybrid IDS is 
efficient in detecting DoS of communicating self-driving 
vehicles. According to the simulator results, we can easily 
distinguish the role of reducing the number of features and 
fuzzification data in improving the performance of the security 
system. The proposed IDS can overcome overlapping problems 
by employing the POS method in order to select the significant 
features and applying fuzzy set “fuzzification” to the extracted 
features. Intelligent IDS can secure the VANETs of self-driving 
vehicles by detecting and blocking malicious behaviours in its 
external communication. The proposed security system is 
mainly suitable for detecting abnormal behaviours that target 
vehicles disturbing the communication between self-driving and 
semi self-driving vehicles. From the experiment, we can observe 
the important role of the IDS in improving the external security 
of communication vehicles under different conditions.  
The IDS has a direct impact on the performance of the 
network by improving the detection rate, as well as decreasing 
the number of false alarms and the error rate. In future work, we 
need to utilize the IDS on VANETs based on a virtual layer, and 
we expect to propose a better intrusion behavior category for 
self-driving vehicles. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
In this research, we have designed a hybrid BP-IDS based on 
the behaviour of connected communicating vehicles. The 
proposed intrusion detection scheme uses an intelligent anomaly 
and misuse detection approach in detecting malicious behaviour 
in VANETs of self-driving vehicles which adapt to the 
heterogeneous communicating environment.  The proposed 
system has the ability to detect the malicious vehicle which is a 
source of an attack. The proposed security system can provide 
sufficient security for VANETs of self-driving cars. This system 
has been built for the training phase and testing phase of two 
system scenarios: normal and abnormal that have been based on 
the Kyoto data set. The IDS is used to analyze the behaviour of 
each vehicle in the IoT to detect if it is a DoS vehicle or a normal 
vehicle. If the car is trying to prevent the access to the resources 
of the network and make these unavailable at any time, this is 
indicated as a DoS vehicle. The hybrid proposed BP-IDS has the 
ability to distinguish between both existing, novel or new 
attacks. 
 The experiment reflects the performance of IDS in detecting 
and isolating DoS. It is good for securing the external 
communication of self-driving vehicles. The proposed BP-IDS 
can well suited for deployment in heterogeneous environment. 
This system is flexible and extensive. It has the ability to detect 
external and internal attacks launched at any time on the 
network. Our proposed IDS can also isolate malicious self-
driving vehicles with high detection rate and can guarantee low 
false alarm. The process of decreasing the features by POS 
technology plays important role in enhancing the detection rate 
of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the fuzzification data help 
declining the number of false alarms and error rate when 
compared with our previous publication. 
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